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I eal estate developers are increas-ingly imposing private transferfee covenants on real estate
under development. A covenant of this
type purports to allow a developer to
collect a fee on each future resale of the
affected land during the term of the
covenant. But is a private transfer fee
covenant valid and enforceable?
Three years ago in this magazine,
Marjorie Bardwell and Jim Durham first
highlighted the use of private transfer
fee covenants in their article, Transfer
Fee Rights: Is the Lure of Sharing in Future
Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, Prob. &
Prop. 24, May/June 2007. That article
raised substantial questions about the
validity of such covenants. Since that
article, however, the imposition of
these covenants has continued to grow
exponentially. Companies now market
private transfer fee covenant documen-
tation to developers. Nevertheless, the
legal basis for the enforcement of such
covenants remains dubious and private
transfer fee covenants are increasingly
commanding the attention of state legis-
latures.
This article will discuss private trans-
fer fee covenants, using one popular
model as an example. After explaining
how a private transfer fee covenant
operates, the article will review the
background legal principles relevant
to its enforceability As this article will
argue, sound policy does not justify
the enforcement of private transfer fee
covenants. The article concludes with
a discussion of recent state legislative
efforts to invalidate private transfer fee
covenants and highlights a new model
statute that, if adopted, would declare
such covenants void as contrary to
public policy.
The Private Transfer Fee
Covenant
Assume that ABC Land Co. is develop-
ing a 500-lot residential subdivision,
known as Shady Acres, and wants to
impose a transfer fee covenant on each
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lot. As in any typical development,
ABC Land Co. records a declaration
within the chain of title for each lot in
Shady Acres. The declaration imposes
a transfer fee covenant that purports
to run with each lot and bind subse-
quent owners for a 99-year period. This
covenant does not impose a fee on the
first sale, so when ABC Land Co. sells a
home to the initial homebuyer (whom
we will call Jones), Jones pays no trans-
fer fee. The covenant, however, provides
that if Jones resells the home during the
99-year term of the covenant, Jones must
pay a fee equal to 1% of the purchase
price. As a result, if Jones resells the lot
four years later for a price of $200,000,
Jones must pay a $2,000 transfer fee to
a trustee identified in the declaration. If
Jones does not pay the fee, the declara-
tion provides that the trustee has a lien
on the land to secure the unpaid transfer
fees and can foreclose that lien (includ-
ing by nonjudicial process, to the extent
permitted by other state law) to satisfy
the fee payment obligation.
On collecting a transfer fee, the
trustee divides the fee among the follow-
ing persons:
" the developer (which typically
retains at least 50% of the transfer
fee right);
* the trustee (which retains a portion
of the fee as compensation for
tracking ownership of the transfer
fee rights and handling transfer fee
payments);
* the company that developed the
private transfer fee documentation
(which retains a portion of the fee
as compensation for "licensing"
the developer to use its documen-
tation);
* in some cases, agents, brokers, and
other professionals associated with
the sale transaction; and
* in some cases, a community
nonprofit organization identified
by the developer (according to one
source, such nonprofits may re-
ceive as much as 5% of the transfer
fee right).
Most importantly, however, this
declaration does not simply impose the
transfer fee covenant only on the first
resale by Jones. Instead, the declaration
also imposes a 1% fee on the seller at the
time of each subsequent resale of the parcel
during the 99-year term. Thus, if the
parcel is sold 11 times during the 99-year
term (or every nine years, on average),
the trustee could collect a 1% fee from
each seller in each of the 11 sale transac-
tions.
A developer could choose to retain its
transfer fee rights and collect from the
trustee its allocated share of the fee on
each future resale during the term of the
covenant. Alternatively, the developer
could instead choose to sell its transfer
fee right immediately. One company
assists developers wishing to sell their
transfer fee rights by pooling those
rights and seeking secondary market
buyers. Freehold Capital Partners, Learn
How Reconveyance Fee Instruments Can
Help You, at 11-12 [hereinafter Freehold
Brochure], available at www.freehold-
capitalpartners.com/forms/freehold-
brochure.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
The "Touch and Concern"
Standard
A substantial question, however, is
whether a private transfer fee covenant
based on this model actually creates an
enforceable legal right. Under traditional
common law rules, the burden of a
covenant did not run to bind a successor
to the original covenantor unless both
the benefit and the burden of the covenant
"touched and concerned" land. Al-
though the precise meaning of "touch
and concern" has never been transpar-
ent, the standard was understood to
protect against the creation and enforce-
ment of covenants that could unreason-
ably restrain the alienability of land.
Historically, American courts strug-
gled in applying this test to evaluate
affirmative covenants to pay money.
Both the benefit and the burden of an
affirmative covenant to pay money can
"touch and concern" land. Neponsit
Property Owners'" Ass'"n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
The best example is the typical owners'
association assessment covenant, which
imposes an assessment on each lot pay-
able to an owners' association to fund
the operation of the association and the
maintenance of common facilities. These
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assessments benefit community resi-
dents directly (for example, by provid-
ing access to pools or parks) or indirectly
(such as by preserving/raising property
values because of the presence of valued
amenities). Ever since the landmark
Neponsit case, courts have held that both
the burden and benefit of a lot assess-
ment covenant "touch and concern"
land and bind successor owners of that
land. This result makes good sense doc-
trinally. Although the covenant does in-
directly restrain alienation of the affected
land, its practical effect on alienability
is negligible. Because many buyers
value the common facilities and ameni-
ties enough to accept the assessments
needed to preserve them, the assessment
covenant constitutes a reasonable and
enforceable restraint.
By contrast, a private transfer fee
covenant is payable only to private
persons, not to an owners' association.
By the time the developer collects a
future transfer fee, the developer likely
will have completed the sale of all af-
fected lots and will have no legal interest
(other than the transfer fee rights) in the
community. As a result, the benefit of a
private transfer fee covenant is personal
to the developer; in the language of the
common law, the benefit of the covenant
is "in gross." Under the weight of com-
mon law authority, if the benefit of a
covenant is in gross, the burden of that
covenant does not run to bind succes-
sors to the original covenantor. See, e.g.,
Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756,758
(Mass. 1995); Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc.
v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986); Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons,
Inc., 170 A.2d 52,56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1961).
The "touch and concern" standard es-
sentially established a prophylactic rule
against thne running of covenants that
created purely personal benefits. In other
words, it did not matter whether the en-
forcement of a covenant in gross actually
constituted an unreasonable restraint on
allenation. Instead, courts viewed the
potential burden on alienabillty posed by
covenants in gross as warranting a per
se rule prohibiting their enforcement
against successors, regardless of actual
harmn. Under this traditional view, a
developer could not enforce a private
transfer fee covenant against subsequent
owners of the affected land.
The Restatement of Servitudes
The status of the "touch and concern"
standard has been called into some
question by virtue of the new Restate-
ment on Servitudes. The Restatement
purports to abandon the "touch and
concern" standard, instead substituting
standards under which a covenant is
enforceable against successors unless
the covenant is "arbitrary, spiteful,
capricious," imposes an "unreason-
able restraint on alienation," imposes
The argument that a
private transfer fee
covenant is a reasonable
restraint depends on a
dubious assumption.
an "unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition," or is "unconscionable."
Restatement (Third) of Property-Servi-
tudes, § 3.1(1), (3)-(5) (2000). If a cov-
enant imposes only an indirect restraint
on alienation, the Restatement suggests
that the covenant does not unreason-
ably restrain alienation unless it "lacks a
rational justification." Id. § 3.5(2).
Under the common law's prophylac-
tic "if the benefit is in gross, the burden
won't run" rule, a developer had little
incentive to impose a private transfer
fee covenant. By purporting to reject this
prophylactic rule in favor of a "rea-
sonableness" standard, however, the
Restatement has encouraged the prolif-
eration of private transfer fee covenants.
In fact, companies marketing private
transfer fee covenants characterize such
covenants as "reasonable" restraints,
and their promotional materials point
to the Restatement for support. Transfer fee
covenant advocates argue that:
A 1% private transfer fee covenant has
no practical burden on the alienability
of land, but only slightly reduces the
price at which a transfer will take placE
Because the covenant is recorded, a
buyer of an affected lot will reduce its
offer price to account for the transfer
fee obligation that the buyer will incur
on resale. Thus, the covenant does not
create an unreasonable restraint on
alienation and should be enforceable a
long as it has a rational justification.
" A 1% private transfer fee covenant
has a rational justification because it
benefits both the developer and the
initial buyer. The covenant benefits the
developer by allowing it to retain the
transfer fee rights, thus assisting the
developer's marketing efforts (that is,
permitting the developer to sell its lots
at a discounted price as compared to
unrestricted land). In turn, the covenan
benefits the buyer, who obtains the
land at a discounted price as compared
to unrestricted land. By lowering the
buyer's acquisition costs, the covenant
in turn reduces the buyer's transaction
and carrying costs (that is, by lowering
the value of the land, the covenant mar
ginally reduces the buyer's borrowing
costs, annual ad valorem tax obligation
and ultimately the buyer's brokerage
commission on resale).
Certainly, some of the strong freedom-of-
contract rhetoric in the Restatement's com-
mentary offers some support for advocates o
private transfer fee covenants:
Many economic arrangements for
spreading the purchase price of property
over time and for allocating risk and
sharing profit from property developmen
can be attacked as indirect restraints on
alienation. If such arrangements are not
unconscionable and do not otherwise
violate public policy, there is usually
no reason to deny the parties freedom
of contract. The parties are usually in a
better position, than judges to decide the
economic trade-offs that will enable a
transaction to go forward and enhance
their overall value. The fact that the value
that may be realized from a parcel of land
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that is part of a larger arrangement
has been reduced does not justify
legal intervention to nullify part or all
of the agreed-on arrangement.
Restatement § 3.5 cmt. a.
Transfer Fees and Land Policy
Notwithstanding the ostensible
justifications offered by those marketing
this product, the enforcement of private
transfer fee covenants constitutes
unsound public policy. Courts should
refuse to enforce these covenants
against successors, for several important
reasons.
Buyers Cannot Accurately
"Price" the Effect of a Private
Transfer Fee Covenant
The argument that a private transfer
fee covenant is a reasonable restraint
depends on a dubious assumption-that
buyers can readily discover the cov-
enant, fully understand and evaluate its
implications, and adjust the offer price
to account for its effect. Even buyers that
know of the covenant cannot "price" its
effect with precision, however.
First, because the amount of the
buyer's future transfer fee obligation is
a function of the land's value at afuture
date, the buyer's ability to "price" the
appropriate discount is a function of both
the expected future appreciation in the
land's value and the appropriate "dis-
count" rate (the rate used to convert the
expected future transfer fee obligation
into present dollars). There is little em-
pirical evidence to suggest that the typi-
cal homebuyer can make an informed or
accurate judgment about future rates of
appreciation or an appropriate discount
rate. Second, buyers lack perfect informa-
tion about their holding periods. A]buyer
that expects to resell the house in only
two to three years can readily appreciate
the need to discount the offer price to
account for the transfer fee that will be
imposed on this expected transaction. By
contrast, a buyer that expects to live in
the house for 40 years may tend to dis-
regard the fee, concluding that its effect
in present dollars is de minimis. Because
buyers lack perfect information about
their likely holding period, they cannot
accurately price the appropriate discount
for the transfer fee covenant.
More importantly, in most real estate
price negotiations buyers lack a way of
evaluating the actual price reduction
that results from the transfer fee cove-
nant or its value in carrying cost reduc-
tions. It is correct to say that ifa transfer
fee covenant enables Jones to pay $2,500
less to acquire the land today-and thus
allows Jones to borrow $2,000 less to
finance the purchase-Jones will save
$100-$120 in interest costs during the
first year (and slightly less during each
subsequent year as the principal balance
amortizes). Jones, however, cannot be
certain that $100-$120 per year will be
saved in borrowing costs unless Jones also
knows that the purchase price of the property
is $2,500 less because of the presence of the
covenant. Unfortunately, Jones cannot be
so confident, unless the developer offers
Jones a choice to purchase the land at
either a "restricted" price (subject to the
covenant) or an "unrestricted" price (not
subject to the covenant). If the private
transfer fee covenant is imposed on
a "take it or leave it" basis, buyers do
not have a meaningful "covenant or no
covenant" choice. Further, because land
is relatively unique, there is likely no
identical "unrestricted" parcel with an
identifiable price that the buyer can use
as a baseline to calculate the incremental
"burden" and "benefit" of the covenant.
Buyers who lack the ability to evalu-
ate the financial effect of the covenant
accurately are likely to underestimate
the covenant's effect, and thus to not dis-
count their offer prices sufficiently. If so,
the covenant presents the developer with
a profitable arbitrage opportunity, and
promotional materials have touted this
opportunity to developers. For example,
the Freehold Brochure suggests that a
1% transfer fee covenant should reduce
the buyer's offer price by approximately
200. Freehold Brochure, at 3. Yet earlier
editions of this brochure estimated the
value of the transfer fee rights at approxi-
mately 5% of the improved value of the
property. If buyers were truly informed
and sufficiently sophisticated to price the
covenant accurately, such a sizable gap
would not be present. This may explain
why-notwithstanding its freedom-
of-contract rhetoric-the Restatement
characterizes a private transfer fee coy-
enant as potentially unconscionable. See
Restatement § 3.7 cmt. c, illus. 3.
Transfer Fee Covenants Unreasonably
Hinder the Alienability of Land
A private transfer fee covenant impedes
future land transactions by imposing ad-
ditional unwarranted transaction costs.
Because the developer may have sold
the right to collect future transfer fees,
the seller may incur additional expense
to locate and pay the holder of the
transfer fee rights, and the fee may have
to be escrowed if that person cannot be
found. Although the developer can ame-
liorate this risk by designating a trustee
to collect the fee, nothing prevents the
developer from imposing a private
transfer fee covenant that requires pay-
ment directly to the developer. Also, the
seller and the buyer must incur addi-
tional costs negotiating responsibility for
payment of the fee. The seller can incur
additional costs in determining whether
disclosure of the covenant is required
(and, if so, ensuring that it makes proper
disclosure). The buyer may incur ad-
ditional time and expense negotiating
with the title insurer over the form of
the exception that the insurer will take
for the covenant. Unless the covenant
subordinates the developer's lien to the
lien of future mortgage loans, the buyer
can incur greater expense in obtaining
financing if the buyer's mortgage lender
insists on obtaining subordination of
the transfer fee covenant lien. Finally,
if private transfer fee covenants are
enforceable, a buyer of the land may
try to impose an additional transfer fee
covenant (to permit the buyer to recoup
the expected cost of having to pay the
first transfer fee), thereby triggering
multiple transfer fees on later resales.
Over time, this "stacking" of transfer
fees would create a needless complica-
tion and impediment to the transfer of
t-e affected land.
Transfer Fee Covenants Reduce
the Tax Base for the Benefit
of Private Parties
Finally, and most important, any finan-
cial benefit that a private transfer fee
covenant creates comes at the expense
of the public. The enforcement of a
private transfer fee covenant will reduce
the value of the affected land, creating
an artificial reduction in the commu-
nity's ad valorem tax base. Incremental
sums that would have gone to the local
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community to fund public education,
infrastructure, and community services
will instead be diverted to developers.
Sound public policy should not permit
private action, taken outside of the com-
munity's democratic processes, to create
a diversion of the tax base for private
benefit.
Recognizing these concerns, in Oc-
tober 2009 the Joint Editorial Board for
Uniform Real Property Acts (JEBURPA)
unanimously resolved that private trans-
fer fee covenants create an unreasonable
restraint on the alenability of land. The
JEBURPA is comprised of representa-
tives from the ABA's Real Property, Trust
and Estate Law Section, the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers, and
the Uniform Law Commission, as well
as liaison members from the American
College of Mortgage Attorneys and the
Community Associations Institute. The
JEBURPA has issued a position paper
expressing the view that state courts
should not enforce private transfer fee
covenants and that state legislatures
should enact statutes declaring such
covenants void as contrary to public
policy.
Recent Legislative Activity
To date, 11 states have adopted statu-
tory provisions directly addressing the
enforceability of private transfer fee cov-
enants. The only state that has explicitly
validated private transfer fee covenants
is California, which has adopted a "dis-
closure" model. In California, a transfer
fee covenant is enforceable against
successors as long as the person impos-
ing the covenant records a document
indicating "Payment of Transfer Fee
Required" in the chain of title to the real
estate. Cal. Civ. Code § 1098.5. This doc-
ument must contain certain information,
including (1) a clear statement of the
amount or percentage of the fee; (2) for
resietilreal estate, "actual dollar-cost
examples of the fee" for a home priced
at $250,000, $500,000, and $750,000;
(3) the expiration date of the transfer
fee covenant, if any; (4) the prpose for
which the funds from the fee will be
used; and (5) the name of the entity to
which the fee must be paid (along with
specific contact information).
By contrast, eight states-Arizona,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Mis-
souri, Oregon, and Utah-have recently
enacted statutes explicitly banning
private transfer fee covenants. Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 689.28 (2007); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 442.558 (2008); Or. Rev. Stat. § 93.269
(2009); Kan. Stat. § 58-3821 (2009); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 33-442 (2010); Iowa Code
§ 558.48 (2010); Md. Real Prop. Code
Ann. § 10-708 (2010); Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-46 (2010). In these states, private
transfer fee covenants imposed after the
effective dates of the relevant statutes are
deemed contrary to public policy and
void.
Likewise, in 2007, Texas adopted
a statute that purports to prohibit the
enforcement of a covenant imposing
a transfer fee on a "transferee of resi-
dential real property or the transferee's
heirs, successors, or assigns... in
connection with a future transfer of the
property... " Tex. Prop. Code
§ 5.017(b). Transfer fee advocates may
argue that private transfer fee covenants
are enforceable under the Texas statute
because they obligate the seller to pay
the fee, not the buyer. This argument is
of doubtful validity, however. First, it
is inconsistent with a literal reading of
the statute; even if a buyer is not liable
for the fee that accrues when the land is
acquired, the covenant still imposes on
the buyer the obligation to pay "a fee
in connection with afuture transfer of
the property" (that is, a future resale).
Second, if the seller fails to pay the fee,
it becomes a lien against the land that
prevents the buyer from delivering clear
title to a subsequent purchaser. Thus,
the better view is that the Texas statute
operates as a ban on private transfer fee
covenants on residential real property.
Finally, while Louisiana does not
have a statute directly addressing
private transfer fee covenants, such a
covenant would almost certainly be
unenforceable under its civil law. The
Louiiana Civil Code requires that a
predial servitude (which is analogous
to an easement appurtenant) provide
a benefit to a dominant estate for that
servitude to be enforceable. La. Civ.
Code art. 647. Further, it allows per-
sonal servitudes (servitudes in gross) to
be enforced only when they provide an
"advantage" (such as an access right)
that could be established as a predial ser-
vitude. Id. art. 640.
A Model Transfer Fee
Covenant Statute
As the use of private transfer fee cov-
enants has accelerated, both the National
Association of Realtors (NAR) and the
American Land Title Association (ALTA)
have adopted comparable policy state-
ments against the use and enforcement
of private transfer fee covenants. ALTA's
statement provides that "these covenants
provide no benefit to consumers or the
public, but rather cost consumers money
complicate the safe, efficient and legal
transfer of real estate, and depress home
prices." American Land Title Ass'n, Private
Transfer Fee Covenants, www.alta.org/
advocacy/ docs/PrivateTransferFee
CovenantOnePager.pdf (last visited Apr.
19,2010). The NAR's statement argues
that "such fees decrease affordability, serve
no public purpose, and provide no benefit
to property purchasers, or the community
in which the property is located." National




228?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
Consistent with their stated policy, both
NAR and ALTA are currently seeking to in-
troduce in state legislatures a model statute
banning transfer fee covenants. This model
statute appears on page 25. Section 1(b) of
the model statute expresses state legislative
findings that private transfer fee covenants
violate public policy by creating an un-
reasonable impediment to the alienability
of land, regardless of the duration of the
covenant or the amount of the transfer fee.
Section 1(c) would prospectively invalidate
any transfer fee covenant recorded after
the statute's effective dat-aigsuch
a covenant unenforceable against the real
property or any subsequent owner of the
property. Section 1(c) also would invalidate
any lien to the extent that it purports to
secure the payment of a transfer fee.
Alhough the model statute would not
apply to private transfer fee covenants
recorded before the statute's effective date,
section 1(d) does provide that the statute
should not be interpreted to validate such
covenants. Thus, in any state that adopts
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this model statute, a court facing a chal-
lenge to a pre-existing transfer fee cov-
enant should evaluate its enforceability
against successors based on the common
law of covenants and servitudes-and
ought to conclude that such a covenant
does not run with the land to bind suc-
cessors.
The model statute does recognize that
a covenant might impose a transfer fee
that is payable to an owners' association
for the purpose of financing association
operations and/or maintenance of com-
mon amenities. Such covenants (the "flip
tax" often imposed by housing coopera-
tives, for example)-would typically have
satisfied the common law's "touch and
concern" test, and thus section 1(a) of the
statute excludes such covenants from the
definition of a "transfer fee covenant."
Likewise, in master planned communi-
ties, some amenities (community centers,
recreational facilities, or performing arts
centers, for example) may be financed
in part by transfer fee covenants on land
within the various common interest com-
munities that comprise the larger devel-
opment. Because such facilities provide
an ostensible benefit to these common
interest communities and the owners
within these communities, covenants
that create transfer fees to fund those
amenities are likewise excluded from the
coverage of the model statute.
Conclusion
Although advocates argue that private
transfer fees are reasonable and benefit
both developers and buyers, these argu-
ments are unpersuasive. Private transfer
fee covenants create an unjustified im-
pediment to the transfer of affected real
estate; further, enforcing private transfer
fee covenants (and thereby lowering the
value of the affected real estate) would
permit a developer to divert a portion
of the community's ad valorem tax base
to the developer's private benefit-all
outside the community's democratic
processes. Accordingly, courts should
refuse to enforce private transfer fee
covenants against successors, and states
should enact legislation (such as the
model statute discussed above) making
clear that private transfer fee covenants
are void because they are contrary to
public policy. U
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